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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONTINUE DEFERRING TO FACULTY JUDGMENTS 





In its landmark 2003 decision Grutter v. Bollinger,1 the Supreme Court held that 
racial diversity in the context of public higher education is a compelling government 
interest, and that a university’s affirmative action policy survives strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause if it is based on holistic, individualized consideration of applicants 
and not a quota.2 The key to Grutter’s holding was its acceptance of the defendant 
University of Michigan Law School’s argument that educational diversity “has the potential 
to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its 
parts.”3 Speaking through Justice O’Connor, the Court credited the law school’s 
determination, based on its faculty’s “experience and expertise,” that having a “critical 
mass” of underrepresented minority students was “necessary to further its compelling 
                                                 
*
 Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Email: stevesan@indiana.edu. My thanks to 
Mary Burgan. Kenneth R.R. Gros Louis, Rachel Levinson, Robert M. O’Neil, and David Rabban, all of whom 
have in their own ways, both through word and example, shaped my own thinking about academic freedom 
and faculty governance. Thanks also to William Baude for thoughtful comments on this essay. 
1 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2 See id. 
3 Id. at 315. 
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interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”4 To the extent the 
Court deferred to the law school’s educational judgment in rejecting the plaintiff’s reverse 
race discrimination claim, Grutter can be understood as an important case for academic 
freedom.5 
During its October 2012 term, the Court will decide Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin,6 a case which anti-affirmative action activists hope to use to overturn, or at least 
narrow, Grutter. In defense of its affirmative action practices, the University of Texas and 
its amici have included among their arguments the same academic freedom justifications 
that resonated with the Grutter majority.7 In this Article, I argue that the academic freedom 
justification for affirmative action is made stronger if the decision to “secur[e] the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body” is understood as an educational policy 
determination within the purview of faculty members exercising their classroom experience, 
academic expertise, and professional judgment.8 
                                                 
4 Id. at 333. 
5 For other commentaries that have explored Grutter’s academic freedom implications at greater length, see 
generally J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the “Four 
Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929 (2006); Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 
B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005). 
6 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (February 21, 2012) (No. 11-345). 
7 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 21, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345) 
(“The Fifth Circuit [in its decision below] also recognized that certain educational judgments fall within the 
zone of academic freedom long recognized ‘as a special concern of the First Amendment.’” (quoting Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)); Brief for American Council on Education et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-
345) (citing Grutter and other authorities for the principle that “academic freedom extends beyond scholarship 
to governance by the academies themselves, including control over the composition of the student body”).  
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
Affirmative Action and Academic Freedom: Why the Supreme Court Should Continue 




Once the issue is framed in this way, it becomes even more apparent why the Court 
should continue to accept a public university’s determination that carefully limited 
consideration of applicants’ race is necessary and appropriate. Were the Court to overturn 
Grutter, it would repudiate a settled principle of deference to educational decisions made by 
faculty members in good faith and based on academic criteria. Just as students in a 
university classroom do not have any constitutional right to create their own syllabus or 
avoid being exposed to ideas with which they disagree, disappointed applicants should not 
be endowed by the Court with a constitutional right to object to the faculty’s professional 
judgment that diversity is essential to the effectiveness of the university’s educational 
mission. 
I. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE FROM SWEEZY TO GRUTTER 
 
Grutter was as much a case about the autonomy and social role of public universities 
as it was a case about Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine. As Justice 
O’Connor wrote for the majority, “[w]e have long recognized that, given the important 
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated 
with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition.”9 
                                                 
9 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
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The Supreme Court first dealt squarely with university academic freedom in the 
1957 case Sweezy v. New Hampshire,10 in which it overturned the contempt-of-court 
conviction of a lecturer at the University of New Hampshire who had refused to cooperate 
with the state attorney general’s inquiry into “subversive activities.”11 In an influential 
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter explained, 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive 
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 
“the four essential freedoms” of a university—to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
be admitted to study.12 
 
Two decades later, the Court addressed one of those “four freedoms”—the 
university’s freedom “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may be admitted to 
study”—in the landmark affirmative action decision Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke.13 In holding that a faculty-designed admissions policy could appropriately take 
account of the educational benefits of racial diversity in its student body, Justice Powell’s 
controlling opinion expressly rested on considerations of academic freedom: “The freedom 
of a university to make its own judgments as to education,” he wrote, “includes the 
selection of its student body.”14 Bakke represented “perhaps the Court’s most significant 
                                                 
10 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
11 Id. at 236. 
12 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting A. v. d. S. Centlivres et al., Statement of Remonstrance by 
The Open Universities in South Africa 10–12). 
13 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263). 
14 Id.  
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affirmation to that date that academic freedom . . . contained a significant component of 
institutional autonomy for colleges and universities.”15 
In Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,16 which was decided the same 
year as Bakke, the Court again emphasized the need for deference to academic decisions 
made by universities through their faculties. Rejecting a student’s due-process challenge to 
dismissal from an academic program, Justice Rehnquist observed that “[c]ourts are 
particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance.”17 And in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Yeshiva University, the Court recognized that the “professional 
expertise” of faculty members “is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of 
academic policy.”18 Observing that “[t]he ‘business’ of a university is education,” the Court 
said a university’s “vitality ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are 
formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance decisions.”19 
In another case rejecting a student’s constitutional challenge to his dismissal from a 
degree program for failure to make adequate academic progress, the Court observed in 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing that “[a]cademic freedom thrives not only 
on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students,” but 
                                                 
15 Horwitz, supra note 5, at 491. 
16 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
17 Id. at 92. 
18 444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980). 
19 Id. at 688. 
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also “on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.”20 Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Stevens emphasized that “the faculty’s decision” not to allow the student to 
continue in his degree program “was made conscientiously and with careful deliberation.”21 
The broader principle was that “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a 
genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s 
professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial 
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee 
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.”22 
The Supreme Court would reaffirm these principles of academic deference in 
Grutter, which, like Bakke, balanced constitutional considerations and upheld a university’s 
right to apply the academic judgments of its faculty in the student admissions process. In its 
brief, the defendant in Grutter argued that “law schools need the autonomy and discretion to 
decide that teaching about the role of race in our society and legal system, and preparing 
their students to function effectively as leaders after graduation, are critically important 
aspects of their institutional missions.”23 
Various amici drove home the academic freedom argument more explicitly. Three 
higher education associations emphasized that the “educational benefits of student body 
diversity” were supported by compelling social science evidence, and that “numerous 
                                                 
20 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted). 
21 Id. at 225. 
22 Id. (footnote omitted). 
23 Brief for Respondents at 25, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
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research studies show that student body diversity can promote learning outcomes, 
democratic values and civic engagement, and preparation for a diverse society and 
workforce—goals that fall squarely within the basic mission of most universities.”24 And a 
brief by the celebrated First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams on behalf of five elite 
private universities argued that “[g]iven the decision of universities through the nation 
(including the amici curiae) that the goal of having a diverse campus which reflects the 
highest academic standards can best be achieved by taking some account of the racial and 
ethnic background of their applicants, any direction then not to do so necessarily 
implicates—and threatens—a core principle of academic freedom.”25 
In her opinion for the majority, Justice O’Connor embraced these arguments, citing 
Sweezy, Horowitz, Ewing, and Bakke, among other cases, and observing that “[o]ur holding 
today is in keeping with our tradition to giving a degree of deference to a university’s 
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”26 Although the issue 
presented was one of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection law, Justice O’Connor 
situated the decision in the context of the Court’s jurisprudence on academic freedom. 
“[U]niversities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition,” she wrote, and their 
“educational autonomy” has “a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First 
                                                 
24 Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
25 Brief for Columbia University et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
26 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
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Amendment.”27 Moreover, “[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body.”28 Here, the University of Michigan 
Law School was exercising its freedom in order to advance a compelling government 
interest: the “substantial,” “important,” and “laudable” benefits of a diverse educational 
environment.29 As one commentator has explained the decision, in the Grutter Court’s 
view, “diversity contributed to a compelling state interest because university officials 
reasonably concluded that it would advance educational goals, and judicial deference to this 
judgment served a constitutional value.”30 
 
 II. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF FACULTY IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING 
 
Authority for governance of a public university runs along a continuum, even 
though the lines of authority frequently blur or overlap.31 At one end are decisions that are 
appropriate for elected officials as representatives of the state’s citizens and taxpayers: for 
example, establishing a new university or setting the amount of the appropriation that the 
state contributes to a university’s operating expenses. Although they affect education, these 
sorts of decisions are essentially political judgments, because they are made by political 
actors. 
                                                 
27 Id. at 329. 
28 Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). 
29 Id. at 330. 
30 Byrne, supra note 5, at 937. 
31 See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 135–40 (2006) (“The 
variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable 
interdependence among governing board, administration, faculty, students, and others.”). 
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In the middle are issues appropriate for decision by the institution’s governing board 
and senior administrators: for example, the decision to create or close an academic school; 
management of the institution’s budget, physical plant, and investments; long-range 
planning and the setting of key institutional priorities. These may be broadly categorized as 
administrative judgments; while they affect education, they also take account of such 
considerations as institutional mission, available resources, and the needs of various internal 
and external constituencies. 
Finally, at the other end of the continuum lie matters that have traditionally been 
reserved to faculty members, individually or collectively, because they involve the 
application of classroom experience, specialized academic expertise, and professional 
judgment: student admissions criteria; the content of courses and syllabi; the coursework 
required for specific degrees; and evaluation of students’ academic work and progress 
toward degrees. These are educational judgments. It is to such educational judgments that 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have typically been most willing to show deference—
as discussed above in cases like Horowitz and Ewing—because they involve the application 
of specialized academic knowledge and experience that judges lack, but which define what 
it means to be a university faculty member. 
Grutter underscored such deference, accepting the defendant law school’s 
determination, based on its “experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the 
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educational benefits of a diverse student body.”32 Of course, “experience and expertise” are 
things that are held and exercised not by institutions as corporate entities, but by the people 
whom they comprise—in this case, the faculty members who had taught the students, 
compiled and assessed the social science evidence, and framed the law school’s affirmative 
action policy. The law school’s argument about the necessity and value of educational 
diversity was anchored in “the educational experience of the faculty.”33 The law school’s 
brief quoted testimony by the dean of another law school, speaking from his experience as a 
teacher, that the classroom “‘dynamic is different within the class among the students and 
between me and the students, when the class is homogeneous’ or has a ‘token minority 
student’ than ‘when there are enough minority students . . . that there is a diversity of views 
and experiences among the minority students.’”34 Thus, the policy upheld in Grutter was 
not the product of a political judgment, which would deserve little judicial deference. Nor 
was it the product merely of an administrative judgment by the university’s trustees, 
president, or the law school dean. Rather, the policy upheld in Grutter was the product of 
educational judgments by faculty members. 
Such educational judgments are entitled to judicial deference because they are 
formed by the prolonged training, rigorous habits of mind, and continuous engagement with 
                                                 
32 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
33 Brief for Respondents at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
34 Id. at 26. 
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their specialties that faculty members are expected to bring to their work. As one longtime 
academic dean has written, 
Final judgments on educational questions are best left in the hands of those with 
professional qualifications: academics who have experienced a lengthy period of 
apprenticeship and have given evidence of performing high-quality work, in 
teaching and research, as judged by their peers on the basis of broad evidence . . . 
Faculty members know the proper definition of subjects and standards, and are more 
likely to have a sense of intellectual frontiers.35 
 
Similarly, a former president of Harvard University has explained the modern 
understanding of institutional academic freedom this way: “curricula, admissions policies, 
and academic standards should be established by the faculty, rather than by outside groups, 
and should be fashioned for the sole purpose of carrying out the educational aims of the 
institution.”36 It follows that, in assessing the constitutionality of any particular university’s 
affirmative action program, a court should expect evidence that the program is indeed the 
product of faculty experience and consensus at that institution, and that the program has 
been studied and endorsed by relevant faculty governance bodies.37 
                                                 
35 HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 270–71 (1990). 
36 DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 5 
(1982). 
37 In Fisher, the brief for the University of Texas does not provide details about the role of faculty in 
authorizing the university’s affirmative action program, explaining simply that the university “reviewed 
admissions data, surveyed students, and held discussions with administrators, faculty, constitutional law 
experts, and others on student body diversity at UT and the possibility of considering race in full-file review of 
applicants.” Brief for Respondents at 9, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-
345). However, the brief does assert that the policy proposal ultimately implemented at UT “embraced the 
diversity interest that this Court found compelling in Grutter in all its dimensions, and observed that ‘[a] 
comprehensive college education requires a robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, 
preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of competencies required 
of future leaders.’” Id. at 11. 
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And so, if universities are owed a degree of deference when they determine that 
diversity is crucial to their educational missions, as Grutter said they were, it is because a 
university’s decisions about its admissions and educational policies are the products of 
faculty members’ classroom experience, academic expertise, and professional judgment. 
Understood this way, a holding that a Grutter-style affirmative action program survives 
strict scrutiny is more than just a policy judgment by the justices that educational 
achievement for racial and ethnic minorities is important for society, or even that 
universities traditionally have been accorded deference on the institutional level. It is a 
recognition that judges should no more second-guess faculty members’ academic 
professional judgment about the educational value of diversity than they should serve as an 
outside review board for a student’s exam grade or academic progress through a degree 
program. 
By the same token, a decision to overturn Grutter would be a dramatic departure not 
only from the settled principle that a university should have the freedom “to determine for 
itself on academic grounds . . . who may be admitted to study,”38 it would also be a dramatic 
departure from the inseparable and equally settled principle that faculties have “the widest 
                                                 
38 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). 
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range of discretion”39 when they make academic judgments, and that this discretion is part 
and parcel of the “autonom[y of] the academy itself.”40 
We would not expect the Supreme Court to announce that students have a 
constitutional right to create their own course syllabus if they disagree with the one 
provided by the professor. Nor would we expect the Court to protect students under the 
Constitution from being exposed in the classroom to ideas or texts that offend their religious 
values or political views, or from being required to write a paper on a topic they dislike or 
from a perspective with which they disagree.41 If faculty educational judgments are to be 
respected, it seems just as clear that disappointed applicants should not be endowed by the 
Court with a constitutional right to object to the university’s determination that diversity is 
essential to the effectiveness of its educational mission. 
In summary, if a university’s faculty members have concluded that a carefully 
limited program of affirmative action, based on individualized consideration of applicants 
and otherwise consistent with Grutter, is necessary to ensure educational diversity and thus 
                                                 
39 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n.11 (1985). 
40 Id. at 226 n.12. 
41 See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951–52, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a “university’s strong 
interest in setting the content of its curriculum and teaching that content” and observing that “consistent with 
the First Amendment[,] a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a particular viewpoint, even if it 
is a view-point [sic] with which the student disagrees, so long as the requirement serves a legitimate 
pedagogical purpose”). 
A professor obviously cannot selectively disadvantage or create a hostile environment toward certain 
individuals or subgroups of students based on their race, religion, or political or social views—such treatment 
would, at a public university, obviously raise serious concerns under the First Amendment, the Equal 
Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause. More to the point, such faculty conduct could not be 
characterized as “genuinely academic,” because it would represent a “substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225. 
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carry out educational objectives—promoting learning outcomes, democratic values and 
civic engagement, and preparation for a diverse society and workforce—then that 
educational judgment should continue to allow the program to survive strict scrutiny. A 
retreat by the Court on this point would be a retreat from the basic principles of 
constitutional academic freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Affirmative action in higher education remains a controversial legal question, 
reflecting ongoing political and social debates about the role of race in American life. In 
Grutter, the Court held that a carefully limited program of affirmative action survived strict 
scrutiny because educational diversity was a compelling government interest. The value of 
educational diversity, in turn, was grounded in faculty members’ classroom experience, 
academic expertise, and professional judgment. As Grutter comes under new attack and 
possible reconsideration, my goal in this Article has been to explain that, should the Court 
now retreat from that view, it would be doing more than ignoring stare decisis or enshrining 
a more conservative view of the Constitution. It would be repudiating a long and important 
line of jurisprudence respecting the freedom of universities—acting upon the educational 
judgments of their faculties—to determine for themselves how best to carry out their 
academic missions. 
